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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
1
Defenseis a classic example of a public or collective good. Our under-
standing of the implications of this fact depends in considerable part
upon the state of the theory of collective goods. In recent years a number
of leading economic theorists have turned their attention to this theory
and they have made some important advances. Still, by comparison
with the theory of private goods, the theory of public goods has been
sadly neglected. There are a number of respects in which this theory
as usually understood is ambiguous and mistaken, and these theoretical
difficulties must be resolved before the implications of the fact that de-
fense is a collective good can be adequately understood.
Any attempt to clarify or improve the theory of public goods should
in turn begin with a clear definition of the concept of a public good.
As John Head has shown,1 two distinct defining characteristics have
been implicit in most discussions of public goods. One defining char-
acteristic of a public good is that itis not possible, or at any rate
NOTE: This article was written before the first named author was employed
by the government and does not, of course, necessarily reflect official views or
policy. The authors are especially thankful to William J. Baumol, James M.
Buchanan, John Hauser, Wallace E. Oates, and Robert T. Smith for helpful
criticisms, but all of these critics disagreed with parts of our argument and share
no responsibility for its shortcomings.
'"Public Goods and Public Policy," Public Finance, No. 3, 1962, pp. 197—219.26 Applying Economics to Defense Problems
economically feasible, to exclude nonpurchasers from the consumption
of it. If, for example, the East Coast is protected against amphibious in-
vasion, Midwesterners cannot feasibly be excluded from the benefits of
this good. The other defining characteristic of a public good is that
if provided to one individual in a group, it can be provided to the others
at little or no marginal cost. To put it differently, it is a good of a type
that can be consumed by an additional individual without any sig-
nificant reduction in the amount available to the original consumers.
Defense usually has this characteristic. So would a bridge in a sparsely
traveled region where even the smallest technically feasible bridge would
entail excess capacity. As the possibility of a toll barrier excluding non-
purchasers at such a bridge reveals, the two defining characteristics
of a public good need not always be present together. A good that has
only one of the aforementioned characteristics can usefully be analyzed
as a collective good, though these two characteristics are most com-
monly found together.
It is immediately evident that the concept of external economies is
included in this definition of a collective good. An external economy
has long been defined as a benefit which nonpurchasers cannot be kept
from enjoying and which therefore cannot fetch a price in the market.
By virtue of this infeasibility of exclusion it is also a collective good.
Many types of external economies are also such that when others come
to enjoy them there may be no proportionate reduction in the amount
available to those who enjoyed them from the beginning. This is the
case with immunization against contagious diseases, for example, where
the immunity from disease acquired by part of the population may
benefit others in the population without reducing the benefits to those
who benefited originally.2
A consideration of external economies and the defining charac-
teristics of public goods suggests that "public goods" might better be
called "collective goods." The phrase "public good" suggests the public
sector, but such goods are also provided by individuals and private
groups and organizations. Obviously, an individual firm or consumer
can provide external economies. Television, one of the better examples
of public goods, is often provided by private firms. Similarly, as one of
2Anexternal diseconomy can similarly be regarded as a collective or public
"bad," and its prevention or minimization as a collective good.Comparative Advantage & Alliance Efficiency 27
the present writers has argued elsewhere,3 almost any organization pro-
vides some collective goods. Labor unions provide many collective
goods to their members and pressure group lobbies provide collective
goods to the groups for whom they win favors. Indeed, a collective or
public good exists whenever any group or organization strives to obtain
a purpose or objective such that, if it is achieved for any one member,
it is automatically available, or can be made available without significant
cost, to the other members of the group or organization. Surely it is
better to classify all goods with similar analytical characteristics together,
rather than to distinguish on institutional grounds those provided in a
given case by governments. Thus we shall here use the phrase "collective
good" rather than its more traditional counterpart, "public good."
The fact that collective goods are inherent in organizational or group
efforts to attain a common objective has a special importance in the in-
ternational context. For it suggests that whenever two or more nations
have a common enemy, and one of the two engages, weakens, or destroys
the common enemy, there will be a collective good or external economy
the other nation may also enjoy. Andasthe ancient maxim that "mine
enemy's enemy is my friend" suggests, this could be true even in the
absence of an alliance treaty, a common ideology, or even cordial rela-
tionships. We therefore conclude that international organizations, inter-
national cooperation, and military alliances, whether tacit or formal,
produce collective goods.
If military alliances and other forms of international collaboration for
common purposes produce collective goods, what are the implications of
this fact? The theory of collective goods and externalities should make
these implications clear, but unhappily recent writings on collective
goods and externalities seem to differ on some of the basic propositions
of the theory. One of the most interesting disagreements concerns the
comparison between the quantity of a collective good that is supplied
under independent adjustment in a "market," and the Pareto-optimal
quantity of that good. The present writers have argued elsewhere that
nations in an alliance tend to provide only suboptimal amounts of the
collective goods they seek,4 and the logic of Pigou's classic model of ex-
Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the
Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass., 1965.
MancurOlson,Jr.,and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of
Alliances," Review of Economics and Statistics, August 1966, pp. 266—279.28 Applying Economics to Defense Problems
ternal economies would also seem to imply that too little of the alliance
good would be provided. This conclusion, however, at first sight appears
to be inconsistent with some important recent papers by James Buchanan
and Milton Kafoglis and by William Baumol.5
II
Let us first consider the important contribution by Buchanan and Kafog-
us. They argued in a seminal paper in the American Economic Review
that it was not necessarily true that independent adjustment or market
organization of an activity with substantial external economies would
fail to provide an adequate outlay of resources on that activity. In their
view, the independent behavior of the individual parties with external-
ities or collective goods might lead to an adequate or even a supraoptimal
level of resources devoted to an activity with external economies. They
claimed that this meant there was a flaw in the "orthodox" argument for
the collectivization of activities with substantial external economies. As
they put it:
The theory of economic policy upon which arguments for the collectiviza-
tion of any activity must be based embodies the prediction that the behavior
of individuals in markets does not produce socially desirable results. In the
orthodox analysis, this prediction stems from the presence of significant
externalities that the market is presumed unable to internalize. In his in-
dependent behavior, the individual is assumed to take into account only the
effects of his actions on his own utility or that of his family group. From
thisitfollows that,ifprivate behavior exerts Pareto-relevant external
economies, the market-generated supply of resources to the activity in
question falls short of the "social optimum," as this is defined by Pareto
criteria.
In this note we shall demonstrate that this orthodox policy implication
is not completely general, and that, in certain circumstances, it may be in
substantial error. Independent or market organization of an activity that is
acknowledged to embody relevant external economies need not result in
an undersupply of aggregate resourceinputs,relativetothat amount
required to satisfy the necessary marginal conditions for Pareto-optimality.6
J. M. Buchanan and M. Z. Kafoglis, "A Note on Public Goods Supply,"
American Economic Review, June 1963, pp. 403—414; W. J. Baumol, "External
Economies and Second OrderOptimalityConditions," American Economic
Review, June 1964, pp. 358—372.
6Buchananand Kafoglis, "Public Goods Supply," p.403. Buchanan and
Kafoglis were not at all explicit about what they believed the policy implicationsComparative Advantage & Alliance Efficiency 29
Buchanan and Kafoglis point out that their interest in this problem
was stimulated by an attempt to "explain" the fact that expenditures on
medical services have expanded more rapidly in the United States than
in Britain in the period since British medical care has been collectivized.
In their opinion, traditional Pigovian externality analysis would have sug-
gested the reverse. Their own model, they find, is at least consistent with
the relatively greater increase in expenditures on medical care under the
market-organized system in the United States. They also speculate that
expenditures on private firearms and private policemen might increase if
public provision of police services were to cease, and this again would
appear to contradict Pigou's analysis and support their own. Finally,
though Buchanan and Kafoglis did not discuss defense or alliances, it
would follow if their analysis is correct that there is no necessary tend-
ency for allied nations to provide too little alliance defense.
Buchanan and Kafoglis consider two separate types of cases of ex-
ternalities or collective goods. If the consumption of a good or service
by one person, say person B, exerts externalities on another person or
persons, say person A, but A's consumption of this good or service
exerts no externalities on B, then the relationship is said to be "nonre-
ciprocal." In the "reciprocal" case by contrast the activity of each party
provides externalities to the others. Buchanan and Kafoglis argue by ex-
ample and start with a case in which any immunization shots obtained
by individual B not only protect his health but also provide a spillover,
in the form of reduced chances of being subject to contagion, to in-
dividual A. But this relationship is assumed to be nonreciprocal, so im-
munization shots given A benefit only him. They then consider cases in
which an immunization shot for B is a perfect substitute for a shot for
A, a better than perfect substitute for such a shot, or a less than perfect
substitute, and find that in some situations independent adjustment will
lead to the same total number of shots as an ideal collective arrangement,
whereas in some other situations it will lead to a smaller number of
shots, and in others to larger numbers of shots.
of their argument were, and there is the possibility that the reader may read
policy positions into their argument that they never intended. On this problem
see Section IV below, including notes 16 and 21. There is a further statement
of at least Buchanan's views on this topic and its policy implications in James M.
Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, "Public and Private Interaction Under Re-
ciprocal Externality," in The Public Economy of Urban Communities, edited
by Julius Margolis, Washington and Baltimore, 1965, pp. 52—73. We had not
read the aforementioned article when our paper was first presented.30 Applying Economics to Defense Problems
The simplest and most instructive case is that in which an immuniza-
tion shot for B is a perfect substitute for such a shot for A, so we shall
consider Buchanan and Kafoglis' geometric treatment of such a case
here. Buchanan and Kafoglis neglect income effects in order that they
may use marginal evaluation curves as demand curves. The valuation
individual A places upon protection from contagious disease at the
margin is therefore given by demand curve DA in Figure 1-A, and the
same is true of B's demand curve DB in Figure 1-B. The marginal cost
of shots is assumed constant and the same for both and is represented
in each figure by the line CC. If A initially considered himself in iso-
lation he would purchase OQ of disease protection. B, who in this non-
reciprocal case by assumption receives no spilover from A, purchases












ImmunizationsComparative Advantage & Alliance Efficiency 31
will reduce his purchase of immunization by one unit for every unit that
B has obtained, i.e., he will reduce his purchase by an amount equal
to OM, and purchase only MQ himself. This total outlay, OM + MQ,
or OQ, is the total equilibrium outlay with independent adjustment.
Buchanan and Kafoglis then compare this market equilibrium with
the Pareto-optimal level of provision. Since each shot given to B pro-
vides immunization both for himself and for A, both A and B can be
made better off by taxing A and using the proceeds to induce B to buy
additional immunization shots. The value to A of immunizations of B
is given by the marginal cost curve CC until it touches A's demand
curve, at which point that demand curve indicates the value of addi-
tional immunizations for him. B's supply curve of immunization pro-
tection for A will be given by the line SB,whichis obtained by sub-
tracting his demand curve from the marginal cost curve. The ideal col-
lective outlay is achieved where B's supply curve intersects A's demand
curve, that is when B obtains OS of immunization and A purchases an
additional SQ of disease protection, for a total of OQ.
What happens in this particular example is that under the ideal col-
lective arrangement A's intake of immunization shots is reduced by
one for every extra shot B is induced to take, with the result that exactly
the same total number of shots is bought under the Pareto-optimal col-
lective arrangement as is bought under the independent market adjust-
ment. Buchanan and Kafoglis therefore draw the general conclusion
that independent market adjustment may sometimes provide as large an
outlay on a good with external economies as an ideal collective arrange-
ment. By varying the conditions slightly, they also show that independent
adjustment can sometimes bring about a larger and sometimes a smaller
outlay on a collective good than an ideal collective arrangement would
employ. Suppose an immunization shot for B were a more than perfect
substitute for a shot for A. Then independent adjustment would lead to
a larger outlay on immunization shots than an ideal collective arrange-
ment. This is the case because each extra shot B takes under the ideal
collective arrangement makes it appropriate to reduce A's outlay by
more than one shot.
When Buchanan and Kafoglis develop examples dealing with the
reciprocal case, where a shot for A helps B as well as vice versa, they
use a hypothetical payoff matrix, showing the payoffs to each of the two
individuals as one or the other, or both, get additional immunization32 Applying Economics to Defense Problems
shots. Still assuming nonstrategic behavior, they show that in their ex-
ample that the action of the two individuals can result in a larger ex-
penditure on shots than an ideal or Pareto-optimal arrangement would.
They also show with their example that the final output, i.e., the amount
of immunization or disease protection, that is obtained under independ-
ent adjustment can be larger than the amount that would be obtained
under a Pareto-optimal arrangement. They argue that this "suggests
that, under independent adjustment, the consumption of final output is
overextended."
III
We shall Eater contend that Buchanan and Kafoglis' very challenging
argument is not satisfactory in every respect, but it will be necessary first
to turn to an interesting and very important paper by William Baumol,
which appeared in the form of a communication in the American Eco-
nomic Review about the Buchanan and Kafoglis contribution. Professor
Baumol offered "an explanation of the Buchanan-Kafoglis result" 8
whichwould "help to substantiate the validity and significance of
[their] argument."One part of Baumol's contribution consisted of
the discovery and demonstration of the important point that, when
externalities are present, the second-order conditions are often violated,
and there are often multiple maxima and corner solutions.1°
The other part of Baumol's contribution is the more relevant here,
for it seems to offer a general explanation of the Buchanan-Kafoglis
examples. Baumol showed that on a social welfare function on which
there are no multiple maxima, and where the second-order conditions
Buchanan and Kafoglis, "Public Goods Supply," p. 411.
SBaumol,"External Economies," p. 360.
°Ibid., p. 359.
10Theplausibility of this contention is easily evident in a situation where, in
the absence of externalities, there would be decreasing returns to scale to each
of two activities. If these activities provide external economies to each other,
however, and the externality of each activity increases withitsoutput,this
may after some point bring about increasing returns for the two activities to-
gether. This could mean a local maximum at low levels of output and another
maximum at higher or conceivably eveninfinitelevelsofoutput, witha
minimum point in between. Similarly, if two activities exert external diseconomies
upon each other,it may be better to have either of the activities operate at
a high level and the other activity at a low (or perhaps zero) level, than it
would to have both operate at something like the same level. In such a situation
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Figure 2
for a maximum are fulfilled, the marginal rules for maximization can
lead the society away from the peak of the social welfare function.
Consider Figure 2, in which the level of welfare achieved is a function
of the levels of activities a1 and a2. The utility surface has a unique
maximum at M. A movement from C to D would be consistent
with the marginal conditions for maximization, for D is at a higher level
of welfare than C. But while D is higher than C, itis nonetheless
farther from the highest point! Going up the hill can move one away
from the top: an improvement can leave one farther from the ideal than
11Weare thankful to Richard N. Cooper for pointing out in his comment on
our paper that the hill in the figure should be drawn in such a way that its
length is not parallel to either of the axes (as it had been in our first draft),
but should rather run diagonally to the axes as it now does. Even if the length
of the hill is parallel to an axis itis possible to move up the hill while moving
farther from the peak, and thus demonstrate the argument of the text. But in
such cases there would be negative returns at the margin to one of the activities.
If on the other hand the length of the hill runs diagonally, it can be possible to
move away from the peak of the hill without negative marginal returns to either
activity.Itisalso possible,if some less regularly shaped hills are drawn, to34 Applying Economics to Defense Problems
The spirit of Professor Baumol's paper is quite different from that of
Buchanan-Kafoglis, since Baumol did not appear to be concerned as
much with whether and when collectivization might be appropriate as
with the dangers of piecemeal planning procedures and the inadequacy
of simple Pigovian analysis. Still, his argument seemed to add strength to
Buchanan and Kafoglis' contribution, for it showed that the rule that an
activity should be expanded when marginal social benefit exceeded mar-
ginal social cost could lead a society away from the welfare ideal. Thus
Baumol argued that his analysis provided "an explanation for the Bu-
chanan-Kafoglis result," 12 and concluded, "Buchanan and Kafoglis have
raised a fundamental point in questioning whether external economies
need always call for increased outputs." 13
Baumol's rigorous, general, and mainly mathematical analysis there-
fore seemed to explain and substantiate the points suggested by Bu-
chanan and Kafoglis' practical and hypothetical examples. Yet in fact
these challenging contributions, important as they are, nevertheless can
be shown to be ambiguous, misleading, and incomplete in several im-
portant respects. Moreover, they both contain contributions of con-
siderable importance which the reader, with some difficulty, has to dis-
cover for himself.
Iv
The first thing that needs to be said is that Baumol's discovery of the
improvement that takes one farther away from the ideal is much more
general and significant than he points out. It can occur whether there
are externalities or not. Whenever a lack of knowledge, a change in
technology, taxation, monopoly, or anything else has left a society off
the ideal point on its social welfare function, it can easily be the case
that the marginal rules can lead it astray—that is, to improvements that
leave it farther from the ideal point.'4 It is of course true that continued
show that it is possible to rise along the path of steepest ascent of the hill, yet
move away from the peak, even when the hill has no local maxima. We are also
thankful to Michael Intriligator and William Vickrey for stimulating comments
on this point.
12 Baumol, "External Economies," p. 360.
p. 367.
14 It may be the case that knowledge is particularly scarce where externalities
are concerned. To the extent that thisis the case, Baumol's argument has a
particular importance when externalities are present.Comparative Advantage & Alliance Efficiency 35
upward movements or improvements will ultimately lead to at least a
local maximum. But if, as is usually the case, resource reallocations are
costly, and if, as is all too common, vested interests that resist change
tend to build up around any given allocation of resources, a long series
of circuitous movements toward the ideal may well be undesirable, if
not practically impossible.15 So improvements that lead a society away
from its ideal may in a dynamic situation actually reduce its long-run
welfare. In other words, if the third best is nearer to the ideal than the
second best, it may ultimately prove costly to move from the third to
the second best. Baumol's point seems to us to be almost as general or
far reaching in its relevance as the well-known theory of the second
best.
But general as it may be, it neither explains nor substantiates the
Buchanan-Kafoglis examples, nor does it reveal that these examples
should suggest conclusions quite different from those that appear to be
suggested in the Buchanan-Kafoglis contribution. This can be seen most
easily by thinking back to the Buchanan-Kafoglis nonreciprocal case,
where an immunization shot for B was a substitute for a shot for A,
but not vice versa, and where the examples suggested that the expendi-
ture on immunization shots could be as great as or even greater under
independent market adjustment than under Pareto-optimal collective ar-
rangements. The problem here is to understand the relevance of the as-
sumption that an immunization shot for B gives immunity to A though
the reverse is not true. This assumption means—and this is the simple
essence of the problem—that there are two different production tune-
lions or productive processes that can be used to produce immunity
from disease in the example, and that these two production processes
vary in their efficiency. If a shot for B protects both B and A and a shot
for A protects only A, the presumption is that B is a more efficient
producer of immunity than A. If, as Buchanan and Kafoglis sometimes
assume, a shot for B is a perfect or more than perfect substitute for a
shot for A, and B also places a positive value on immunity, it is neces-
sarily the case that B is a more efficient producer of immunity than A.
All this can be easily seen by returning to Figure 1, where it is obvious
that there is a larger output of immunity under the ideal collective ar-
15 We are thankful to Gardner Patterson for reminding us of the importance
of such obstacles to resource reallocations in this context.36 Applying Economics to Defense Problems
rangements (OQ + OS) than under independent market adjustment
(OQ + OM), even though the total number of shots taken is the same
in both cases. The reason is that some shots have been reallocated from
A to B. Indeed, Buchanan and Kafoglis point this out themselves.
If there are two different ways of producing a product, such as im-
munity from disease, and one is more efficient than the other, it will
often be the case that more will be spent on the good if the less ef-
ficient method of production is employed, even though less is produced.
If the users of a good have a demand curve for the good with an
elasticity of less than unity in the relevant range, then increasing the
cost of this good to its users will increase their expenditure on the
good. The use of a less efficient process of producing a good raises its
supply curve and makes it more costly for its users (consumers). This
then is the explanation of all of Buchanan and Kafoglis' nonreciprocal
examples: the assumption that when one individual uses an input an ex-
ternal economy is created for the other, when the reverse is not true,
suggests that one individual is a more efficient producer of output (in
this case immunity) than the other. When an ideal collective arrange-
ment is obtained, more of the input is given to the more efficient pro-
ducer, so that more output is obtained per unit of input. The result is
that expenditure on inputs (immunization shots) may decrease when col-
lectivization brings about the use of a more economical productive proc-
ess, but that output (immunity from disease) increases.
Our purpose is not to suggest that Buchanan and Kafoglis or Baumol
failed to understand this point. Indeed, there are textual passages and
footnotes in the two papers we have discussed, and in other works by
these authors, which suggest that they did.1° Our principal purpose is
18Seethe perceptive footnote 9 on page 364 of Baumol, and the paragraph
on page 406 of Buchanan-Kafoglis, where they refer to the need to distinguish
units of resources supplied from units of final output. See also the previously
cited article by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock on "Public and Private
Interaction under Reciprocal Externality." On page 61 of that paper, the authors
say:
"Itispossible that the reciprocal external economies are such that only
through collective organization can a sufficiently unequal distribution of services
be implemented, so as to achieve efficiency. In this instance, collectivization allows
a specific technological improvement in distributionto be made thatisnot
possible under private provision. This seems reasonably common with some
real-world public services.Police do not patrol everystreet with the same
intensity. The national defense establishment concentrates its services at strategic
points."Comparative Advantage & Alliance Efficiency 37
rather to clarify the matter and show its essential simplicity. This seems
necessary, for many altogether capable economists of our acquaintance
who have read the Buchanan-Kafoglis and Baumol contributions have
misunderstood them, and have in particular totally failed to see the
simple point we have explained above. Another of our purposes is to
show that the value of Baumol's contribution is not in any explanation
of the Buchanan-Kafoglis examples (it does not by itself provide a suf-
ficient explanation of these examples), but rather in the more general
discoveries that it contains. Our final purpose has been to make the
true policy implications of the Buchanan-Kafoglis examples clear. Bu-
chanan and Kafoglis' paper often leaves the impression that it calls
into question "the theory of economic policy upon which arguments for
the collectivization of any activity must be based" 17aswell as the "ortho-
dox policy implication" 18ofthat theory. Whatever Buchanan and Kafog-
us thought about the policy implications of their argument, they never-
theless do not point out anywhere in their paper that a primary pol-
icy implication that may be drawn from their examples is that the
shortcomings of independent adjustment in a free market with ex-
ternalities are greater than has previously been understood. There is
now a new and additional reason for collectivizing economic activities
with externalities. For the Buchanan-Kafoglis finding that the expenditure
on a good with externalities may be as great or greater with independent
adjustment than under ideal collective arrangements clearly shows that,
when external economies are present, the market mechanism may not
only provide less of the good than is optimal (as Pigou told us long ago),
but will often also make society pay more for the suboptimal quantity
of the good than it would have had to pay for the larger amount an ideal
collective arrangement could provide (as we have now discovered). Or,
to put the same point in a different way, the examples in Buchanan
and Kafoglis show that independent adjustment in a market with ex-
ternalities will normally lead not only to the production of the wrong
amount of a good, but also to an unnecessarily inefficient location or
method of production. Only in the highly special case where all parties
who create externalities provide the same amount of spillover per unit
of input will the location or method of production be the same under
17Buchananand Kafoglis, "Public Goods Supply," p. 403.
18Ibid.,p. 403.38 Applying Economics to Defense Problems
independent market adjustment and under an ideal collective arrange-
ment; and in this special case the traditional Pigovian analysis is ap-
propriate. The traditional Pigovian model overlooks the general connec-
tion between externalities and the method of production, and is to that
extent inadequate, but the traditional argument that externalities will
tend to lead to inefficient market outcomes is now twice blessed.19
The considerable practical importance of this matter is illustrated by
the police and medical examples cited by Buchanan and Kafoglis. We
know that they argued that the total expenditures on firearms, guards,
locks, and other forms of protection might well increase if the public
provision of police services were to stop. This seems plausible, and we
can now see why it is. The private, decentralized provision of police
services would presumably be less efficient than centralized provision of
the same services, with the result that society might have to pay more for
protection even though it obtained less. The same thing might be said
of defense, though here the relative inefficiency of private, decentralized
defense provision might be so great that even the smallest useful unit of
defense protection would be prohibitively expensive for an individual
citizen. It was an attempt to "explain" why expenditures on medical
care have increased more rapidly in the United States than in Great
Britain since nationalization which Buchanan and Kafoglistell us
prompted their study. The explanation of this phenomenon which Bu-
chanan and Kafoglis' various examples suggest is that the production of
medical care in Britain is, because of nationalization, more efficient
than in the United States, and that the British are getting more health
protection than a comparison of expenditures on medical services would
suggest.2° We may personally doubt that this is anything like a satis-
'9Thereis of course no suggestion here that allactivitieswith externalities
ought to be collectivized, or that there should in practice necessarily be any
increase in collectivization. The ideal collectivization assumed here for purposes
of analysis and comparison will rarely if ever be attainable in the real world,
and in some cases the imperfections of a market mechanism distorted by ex-
ternalities will be less serious than those of a collective arrangement.
20Weare thankful to Frederic M. Scherer for calling our attention to the fact
that monetary expenditures on the National Health Service may very well
understate the increase in the amount of resources allocated to medical purposes
in the United Kingdom since that industry was collectivized, foritisoften
observed that the length of queues has increased since collectivization. The
longer queues have an obvious opportunity cost, and may bring a fuller utiliza-
tion of doctors and hospitals that would reduce the money cost of a given
amount of medical treatment.Comparative Advantage & Alliance Efficiency 39
factory explanation of this very complex phenomenon, but we do empha-
size that this explanation is what is implicit in the Buchanan-Kafoglis
argument.21
V
There is, however, one numerical example in the Buchanan-Kafoglis
paper that our analysis does not at first appear to explain. This is a
fascinating hypothetical example of reciprocal externalities; that is, an
example of a situation in which both A and B confer external economies
on each other. The example is in the form of a payoff matrix showing
the returns to A and B from different levels of immunization; this
example proves that the expenditure on a good with externalities cannot
only be greater under independent adjustment than under an ideal col-
lective arrangement but also that output can be greater under inde-
pendent adjustment. According to Buchanan and Kafoglis, this finding
"suggests that, under independent adjustment, the consumption of final
output is overextended." 22 This result seems impossible both in terms of
traditional analysis and of the argument of the present paper. Thus we
must ask how the logical possibility that has been demonstrated by
example can be explained.
The explanation again centers on the differing efficiencies of the dif-
ferent ways in which external economies or collective goods can be
generated or produced, but now it will be necessary to distinguish be-
tween different degrees of efficiency in the production of a given ex-
ternality in an over-all or total sense, and different degrees of efficiency
in the production of particular marginal units. Assume that in a given
case there are two relevant alternative ways to produce a given collective
good or externality. One is the manner that results with independent ad-
justment, which we shall call "means 1." The other way involves con-
21 After this paper was written, we read James M. Buchanan, The incon-
sistencies of the National Health Service, London, The Institute of Economic
Affairs, Occasional Paper No. 7, 1965. In an appendix to this most challenging
pamphlet, Buchanan relates his paper with Kafoglis to the National Health
Service in more detail, and explicitly points out that itis logically conceivable
that collectivization could have brought increased efficiency which could account
for the relatively modest increases in medical expenditures in Britain since the
National Health Service was created.
22 Buchanan and Kafoglis, "Public Goods Supply," p. 411.40 Applying Economics to Defense Problems
centrating all of the generation of production of the collective good in the
unit able to produce it at lowest total cost. This latter manner of produc-
tion, which would be used by an ideal collective arrangement, we shall
call "means 2." Though it is assumed that (for any and every output)
total costs of production are less by using the second manner of produc-
tion rather than the first, it is nevertheless possible that, over some limited
range, the marginal costs of producing the good might be less if means
1 had been used. This is illustrated in Figure 3, where it is apparent
that everywhere total costs of production are less using cost curve TC2,
and that output 0Q2isPareto-optimal. Nonetheless, when the cost
curve embodying less efficient means 1 is used, marginal costs are lower
over a considerable (and crucial) range. With this cost curve, total gains
are at their maximum at of output—that is at a level of output
greater than the Pareto-optimal level of 0Q2. This shows that in certain
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larger when a less efficient means of production is used than it is when
more efficient means of production is used.23
23Theargument in the text required the assumption that an ideal
could not have produced every unit of the collective good at a marginal cost
as low or lower than that confronting any individual member. In a different case,
such as the one described in the figure below, where an ideal collectivity would
use means 2 to produce all of the units which could be produced with the lowest
$
0
marginal cost by that means, and at the same time enjoy that segment of TC1
which indicates lower marginal costs over a range with means 1, it would have a
cost curve such as TC0. This cost curve consists of cost curve TC2 up to point H
and has the same slope as cost curve TC1 after that. If with ideal collectivization
it is possible to produce each unit of a good by whatever means has the lowest
marginal cost curve for that unit, then obviously no means of production can
have a lower marginal cost at any point than can be achieved under ideal col-
lectivization. When thisistrue,a result of the kind which Buchanan and
Kafoglis demonstrated by example and which we explained in the text is im-
possible. Since, in the case at hand, the profits using the independent adjustment
cost curve TC1 are higher at 0Q2 than at 0Q1, and since total costs of produc-
tion cannot rise more between 0Q2 and 0Q1 along than along TC1 (because
has by definition at every output level a slope equal to the flatter of the
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In the presence of external economies, independent adjustment would
not, to be sure, lead to output OQi. For obvious Pigovian reasons, each
party will normally neglect the benefits its production confers upon the
others and produce too little of the collective good. In other words, in-
dependent adjustment would notattaineven the local maximum
along cost curve TC1. Still,itispossible that independent adjust-
ment along cost curve TC1 could lead to an output such as (say)
0Q5, which is larger than the Pareto-optimal output, 0Q2.Wenow
have an explanation of how it was possible that the Buchanan-Kafoglis
numerical example could show a larger output of immunization with
independent adjustment than with a Pareto-optimal collective arrange-
ment. Their example is in fact accounted for by relationships of the
kind we have just described.24
rangement must also be greater at 0Q2 than at 0Q1. More generally, no other
available cost curve could lead toa higher optimal output than that which
would be optimal with the ideal collective cost curve. In such circumstances, it
is not possible that independent adjustment could lead to a larger output than
is Pareto-optimal.
The assumption which isnecessary to the Buchanan-Kafoglis example ex-
plained in the text is not, however, always altogether without realism. If the
total costs of producing X + 1units of a collective good are less by having
individual B produce every one of these units, but the marginal cost of the X + 1
th unit would have been less through individual A if he also produced all (or
some) of the X units, the assumption implicit in the Buchanan-Kafoglis example
would be realistic. In other words, if the marginal costs of generating an ex-
ternal economy through a given individual are a function of the number of
units he has previously generated (as is surely often the case), then an ideal
collectivity often could not produce every unit that it produced with marginal
costs as low or lower than would prevail under every alternative means of
production. And whenever the marginal costs of generating additional units of
an externality are higher, over some range, for the ideal collectivity than for
some individual member, as they are in the Buchanan-Kafoglis example, a result
of the kind explained in the text is possible.
24 The payoff matrix inthe Buchanan-Kafoglis example revealsthatthe
efficiency with which immunityisproduced varies between A and B. The
Pareto-optimal solution consists in giving three shots to B and none to A, for B
is the more efficient producer of immunity. The independent adjustment equi-
librium is found when A and B get two shots each, or a total of one more
than in the Pareto-optimal solution. Though dividing the immunization shots be-
tween A and B means generally higher costs of immunity than would result
from giving all of the shots to B, once three shots have been given to B a
fourth shot brings so little extra immunity that itis not worth its cost. But if
the less efficient practice of having both A and B take immunization shots has
been followed, a fourth shot turns out to add a considerable amount of im-
munity. Thus though the total cost of immunity is lower ifall of the shots
are given to B, over one crucial range the marginal costs of immunity are
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The finding that output under independent adjustment can be greater
than the ideal collective or Pareto-optimal level does not however suggest,
as Buchanan and Kafoglis claim, "that, under independent adjustment,
the consumption of final output is overextended" even in the special
cases we have considered. For if the production processes used under
independent adjustment continue to be used, every one can be made
better off by increasing output still farther. This is because of the classic
Pigovian reason that the individuals are not rewarded for the external
economies they provide to others, and will normally produce too little
with any given method of production. The output is larger than that
which would be provided by an ideal collective arrangement because of
the special relationship of the different cost functions used in each case.
Still, the output under independent adjustment cannot be said to be
overextended, since if it were reduced and nothing else were changed,
the situation would be worse for all concerned.
VI
Now the apparent contradiction between the alternative collective goods
and externalities theories with which we began this paper can be re-
solved. We started out by pointing to the fact that different collective
goods or externality theories were apparently contradictory and that these
contradictions had to be resolved before the international implications
of the fact that defense was a collective good could be understood. We
were concerned about the fact that the present authors' earlier collective
goods model and the traditional Pigovian externalities model, both of
which indicated that external economies, or more generally collective
goods, led to suboptiinal outputs under independent adjustment, were
apparently contradicted by the discoveries of Buchanan-Kafoglis and
Baumol, which appeared to suggest that independent adjustment might
not systematically lead to suboptimality.
We are now in a position to see that the conflicts between the dif-
ferent models tend to disappear when they are examined more closely.
Though it may have seemed from Buchanan and Kafoglis' discus-
result from independent adjustment. The irregular quality of the payoff matrix
is further reflected in the fact thatit has two local maxima. One (inferior)
local maximum occurs not far from where the independent adjustment equi-
librium is found. The other (superior) maximum is of course at the Pareto-
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sion of their hypothetical and practical examples, which appeared to
destroy the orthodox externality analysis, and from Baumol's proofs,
which appeared to confirm the Buchanan-Kafoglis findings, that the
orthodox analysis was fundamentally incorrect, this was a mistaken im-
pression. In fact, the Buchanan-Kafoglis examples can be explained
entirely in terms of the fact that the efficiency with which external
economies are generated depends on who generates them. When this is
recognized, it is clear that the Pigovian case for collectivizing activities
with externalities is (contrary to our original impression) strongly re-
inforced, for independent adjustment in a market will not (except by
accident) lead to the use of the most efficient method of generating ex-
ternalities. Since collectivization can lead to the most efficient organiza-
tion of the production of the external economy, we have in fact a new
case for collectivization, and one that complements the traditional Pigo-
vian argument.
Baumol's striking discovery of the upward-move-that-takes-one-far-
ther-from-the-top does, it is true, show that with incomplete information
producers of a good with external economies could in certain dis-
equilibrium situations produce a supraoptimal supply of such a good.
But the possibility Baumol discovered could lead to suboptimality as
well as to supraoptimality and does not contradict the view that inde-
pendent adjustment in the presence of external economies systemati-
cally leads to suboptimal provision. Moreover, Baumol's finding on
the upward-move-that-takes-one-farther-from-the-top does not properly
explain any of the Buchanan-Kafoglis examples, and is in fact instead
a discovery of sweeping significance that has no unique application
to externalities.
Our view in short is that the contributions in the pathbreaking papers
by Buchanan-Kafoglis and Baumol are not what they appeared to be,
and that they have not impaired, but rather helped to give a new dimen-
sion and importance to the orthodox conclusion that independent ad-
justment in a market cannot deal efficiently with externalities
25Sinceall of the Buchanan-Kafoglis and most of the Baumol arguments
were expressed in terms of external economies rather than diseconomies, we
have also confined our attention to external economies. But all of the argu-
ments that have been made can easily be made to apply to diseconomies. Our
basic argument would suggest that when the firms producing some good or
service generate external diseconomies, independent adjustment will not only mean
that too much of this good or service will normally be produced, but alsoComparative Advantage & Alliance Efficiency 45
vi'
The principal insight uncovered by our analysis of the recent theoretical
advances in this area has a special relevance to defense and military
alliances. As we have pointed out before, each ally's military spending
provides an external economy to the other allies. And defense is a col-
lective good that can be produced more efficiently by some nations than
others. If, say, Germany and Italy are in the same alliance, and it hap-
pens that one of these nations is relatively efficient in military matters
and the other is not, it would be a necessary condition of economic
(and military) efficiency that the militarily more efficient nation provide
a larger share of the alliance's military capacity and the other ally export
more private goods to it in return. The nation which has the comparative
advantage in the collective good of defense would have to specialize in
that, and the nation that has the comparative advantage in private goods
would have to specialize in such goods. This would make it possible
for them to "trade" to their mutual advantage.
Defense in turn can be divided into missile capability, naval capa-
bility, infantry capability, and so on. Presumably different allied nations
will produce each of these capabilities with different degrees of ef-
ficiency. This suggests that there can also be mutually advantageous
"trade" between different allied nations in particular military collective
goods. In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, this might mean that
the United States would provide the missiles, Britain the navy, Turkey
that the distribution of output among the firms in the industry and the nature
of any efforts to minimize the injury inflicted by the diseconomies, will tend to
be inefficient. An optimal solution would require that those firms with the
"largest" external diseconomies, thatis,those that inflictthe most injury to
others per dollar of output, must restrict their output more than other firms in
theindustry. More generally,our arguments suggeststhatPareto-optimality
would require that the least-cost method of dealing with the diseconomy be
chosen. And this would often require that part of the effort to deal with the
diseconomy be undertaken by those who are injured by it, since the cost involved
in their "fencing out" or otherwise avoiding the external diseconomy might be
less than the costs involved in preventing or limiting the extent of the diseconomy
at its source. This in turn means that the common suggestions to the effect that
those who generate external diseconomies ought to be made to pay their victims
the full value of any losses they suffer, can work against the achievement of
Pareto-optimality. When such a suggestionis put into practice, those injured
by the externality have no incentive to attempt to protect themselves against
the external diseconomy, even if this would be more economical than dealing
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the infantry, and so on. Each nation would produce that collective good
(if any) which it produced with comparative advantage, anditsallies
would consume the spillover.
It will of course very often be the case that nations (sometimes with
good reason) will value military self-sufficiency more highly than the
gains in economic and military efficiency which international specializa-
tion in collective goods could bring about, just as they often sacrifice
the gains from free trade in private goods in order to enjoy tariff pro-
tection. But to say that it will sometimes be politically impossible, or on
balance undesirable, to follow the dictates of comparative advantage, is
not to say that an understanding of comparative advantage is useless,
either with respect to collective goods or individual goods. Thus, how-
ever great the difficulties and complexities of the real world may be,
there isstill surely a need to call attention, in a relatively general,
theoretical way, to the potential gains from trade in collective goods.26
In some particular, practical cases these gains have been subjected to
penetrating study. Malcolm Hoag pointed out some time ago, in an im-
portant article, that the NATO alliance could be made more efficient
by applying the principle of specialization according to comparative ad-
vantage to various types of military capability.27 Hoag did not use the
theory of collective goods in his argument, but relied instead on the
theory of international trade.
The point that Hoag and others have illustrated in certain concrete
26 This paragraph was inserted after the paper was presented at the conference
because the comments helpfully revealed that these points, which we had barely
mentioned and to some extent even taken for granted, in our presentation to
the conference, should have been made clearly and explicitly.
We have alsonot distinguished(inthisparticular paper)thecollective
(alliance) and individual (national) benefits which usually accrue from military
expenditures by an alliance member. This does not mean, however, that our
analysis does not hold when an alliance member receives significant private or
purely national benefits from its defense spending. This individual benefit would
be reflected in a higher demand curve for its own as opposed to its allies' defense
spending. When there are significant noncollective or purely national benefits
of this sort within an alliance, even inefficient producers of defense (or of some
particular type of defense) may produce some of the good, and this could be
rational, not only from the point of view of the individual nation, but sometimes
also from the point of view of the alliance as a whole. The rationale for such
expenditure isthat the private benefits which result from it more than com-
pensate for the fact that itis more expensive than the military capability that
could be provided by the more efficient allies.
27 Malcolm Hoag, "Economic Problems of Alliance," Journal of Political
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cases has, however, been ignored in all of the theoretical literature with
which we are familiar. This is the point that collective goods or ex-
ternalities imply spillovers from one party to another, and that these
spillovers should be regarded as a special type of trade.28 As we in-
ferred from the Buchanan-Kafoglis examples, these spillovers will nor-
mally be produced with different degrees of efficiency by alternative
producers. This means that economic efficiency will usually require that
some produce one kind of spilover, others another, and that still others
produce only private goods. In brief, the theory of externalities and
collective goods has to be combined with the theory of comparative
advantage. That is the most basic and general point of this paper.
When the theory of collective goods and the theory of comparative
advantage are combined, the problems of military alliances can be stud-
ied in a more unified and coherent way than has been possible before.
For when these two theories are used together, it becomes evident that
an alliance organized in the way that NATO is organized suffers from
at least two systematic inefficiencies. On the one hand, it will normally
28 When each of the members of a grout, produces some single collective good
that also benefits the other members of the group and they thusall trade
spillovers of this good, there is the question of how they should compensate
each other to obtain a Pareto-optimal supply of the good. If each member of
the group is allowed to choose his own output of the good, there will need to
be transfers of money or other sidepayments, since otherwise each member will
ignore the benefits of his production to others when deciding how much to
produce. This is not in dispute.
But itis perhaps not generally known that some obvious and seemingly ideal
compensation schemes that economists might suggest will in fact not be con-
sistent with Pareto-optimality. Take, for example, this compensation rule: "Each
member pays to the other members the value to himself of the spillover they
provide." This intuitively appealing compensation scheme would in fact lead to
a supraoptimal supply of the collective good. This is not the place for a com-
plete, lengthy explanation, so that will be left for a future publication. But in
essence, the reasoning isas follows. When a group member decides whether
or not to produce an additional amount of the collective good under this com-
pensation scheme, his return can be distinguished into three parts: 1) the value
of the additional amount of the collective good to himself, 2) the compensation
he receives from the other members (which is under the rule equal to the value
of the additional amount of the good to the other members), and 3)the
decreaseinthe amount of compensation he must pay the other members for the
collective good he has received from them (this will tend to decline as his
own output increases, assuming declining marginal utility of the good, for the
more he produces, the less valuable to him is any given amount of spillover from
others, and the less the compensation he owes). Since returns 1) and 2) are
toget.her equal to the full social value from the additional amount of the col-
lective good, the additional return of type 3) leads to a supraoptimal production
of the collective good for the group.48 Applying Economics to Defense Problems
produce a suboptimal output of alliance defense, and on the other, it will
fail to produce that amount of defense it does obtain in the most ef-
ficient places. The potential gains from greater integration or collectivi-
zation therefore seem considerable. But among nations, as within them,
there is also a reasonable concern for the sovereignty of the individual
decision-making unit.
COMMENTS
PAUL G. CLARK, Williams College
The central issue raised by Hoag's paper is: Where does analytical
marginalism not apply in the economics of defense? The particular basis
for exceptions which he argues is the phenomenon of increasing returns
to scale. The main question on which I shall try to comment, therefore,
is the significance of exceptions based on increasing returns. At the end
I shall also mention briefly a different basis for departing from analytical
marginalism.
It is helpful to be clear at the beginning that we are concerned with
peacetime decisions about the preferred mix of inputs for defense prep-
arations. Moreover, we are concerned with decisions by the United
States—that is, for our present purpose, by a country with many diverse
worldwide interests; seeking conservative and reform objectives which
call for ability to respond militarily rather than to initiate military
hostilities; with a large, high-income, progressive economy; dealing with
the Soviet Union in what is still essentially a bipolar nuclear situation;
but operating in other respects in a complex system of allies, neutrals,
and hostile countries. Our analysis might well be different for other
defense decisions or for countries in other circumstances.
Hoag's principal case is derived from combat. It is that there are
dramatically increasing returns to scale for defense inputs into a par-
ticular military operation, until a margin of superiority over the enemy's
inputs has been attained sufficient to win militarily. Accepting this com-
bat phenomenon as valid, let me discuss its implications for defense
preparations at three levels—the engagement, the theater, and the world.
At the level of the engagement, I presume it is generally accepted
that, with a given budget for the engagement which provides this margin
of superiority, there are a wide variety of input mixes with decreasing
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nomenon of increasing returns to the budget for the engagement, up
to this point, calls for a significant departure from the marginal ap-
proach. This question, however, must be considered at the level of the
theater.
Within the theater, there are many possible engagements which po-
tential enemies may choose, and accordingly the model for deciding on
defense preparations must be one with multiple contingencies. Accepting
the phenomenon of increasing returns to defense inputs specialized for
particular engagements, let us assume further that the given budget for
the theater is not sufficient to provide in this way the desired margin of
superiority for all contingencies. The preferred adjustment here, however,
is not to abandon some contingencies for others, which would leave
potential enemies free to choose engagements so as to make the returns
to the theater budget zero. The preferred adjustment is rather to pro-
vide some mobile defense inputs which, together with some specialized
inputs, will give similar expected outcomes in all contingencies. Then
quite possibly, depending on the substitutability among inputs permitted
by military technology, and on the inventiveness of the decision-makers,
the situation may be converted into one in which the given theater
budget is operating in a range of decreasing returns, now positive, while
particular inputs within the preferred mix are also subject to decreasing
returns. It is an empirical question, but I suggest that this is a common
rather than a rare situation in theater defense preparations. If after such
adjustments there are still increasing returns to the budget for the
theater, we must move to the level of the world.
Within the world, there are many possible theaters which potential
enemies may choose, and we can repeat the same kind of analysis. Again,
by adjusting to a suitable mix of mobile and specialized inputs, a given
budget for the world may quite possibly be converted from the range of
increasing to a range of decreasing returns. There are two further pos-
sibilities as well. The budget for worldwide preparations can be ex-
panded to get over the range of increasing returns; this has been an
especially suitable option for the United States because of her large, high-
income, progressive economy and similar allies. Moreover, since theaters
within the world are much less interdependent than engagements within
a theater, defense of some theaters can be abandoned to attain the range
of increasing returns in others; actually it does not appear that this
option has been necessary for the United States and her affies.50 Applying Economics to Defense Problems
Hoag also presents two other cases of increasing returns which he sug-
gests call for departures from analytical marginalism. One is economies
of scale in production of particular defense inputs. In view of the great
variety of defense inputs required, I would suggest that the effect of
this phenomenon is simply to bend design and procurement further to-
ward multipurpose, i.e. mobile, rather than specialized inputs. The other
is increasing returns over some range for network-type inputs, such as a
reasonably reliable antiballistic missile system. For defense of cities, I
would suggest that this range is significantly limited by the rapidly de-
creasing size of cities, when ranked by size, characteristic of industrial
countries.
All in all, Hoag's paper should contribute to making defense analysts
sensitive to phenomena of increasing returns where they arise in defense
problems, and prepared to adjust their analyses accordingly. At the
same time, I feel that the cases of increasing returns which Hoag cites
do not constitute very extensive grounds for departing from the general
approach of analytical marginalism. It is not really clear to me how
signfficant he considers these exceptions based on increasing returns. To
recall his phrase, there may be "no inconsistency" here, even though
there appears to be "a contrast."
On the other hand, there is a crucial field of defense decisions in
which a quite different ground for departing from the marginal approach
exists. Hoag clearly recognizes this other ground and simply has not
taken it as the subject of his present paper. I refer to decisions on the
major types of military capability to obtain, such as NATO conventional
forces, Polaris submarines, or an antiballistic missile system, in which a
central element of the problem is the reaction of the Soviet Union in her
decisions on major types of military capability. In this bipolar field, a
game analysis which is intrinsically nonmarginal is called for. It seems to
me that this is the most significant answer to the general question raised
by Hoag, about where analytical marginalism does not apply in the
economics of defense.
Let me add only one comment on the paper by Olson and Zeckhauser.
It presents a persuasive rebuttal to criticisms of the generally accepted
proposition that collective goods, in this case defense services of allies,
tend to be provided at less than Pareto-optimal levels unless appropriate
nonmarket institutions are introduced. Here the scale of a country's con-
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appropriate. It is interesting to note that the basis for the exception is
again the game character of approaches toward the optimum—though
in this case it is a game among allies.
RICHARD N. COOPER, U.S. State Department and Yale University
I will ignore Lanchester's precept to concentrate one's forces in local
engagement by dividing my comments between the two preceding papers.
I take comfort, however, from the fact that I am well flanked by my
fellow discussants.
The basic point of Hoag's paper seems to be that the skepticism
by military officers regarding the application of marginal cost-benefit
analysis to military problems is justified when one takes into account
Lanchester's Law and other manifestations of increasing returns to scale.
The attempt to solve problems of national defense within the con-
ceptual framework of economics, pursued most notably and successfully
by RAND economists in the midfifties, is given the caution signal. While
I agree with many of Hoag's observations, I would temper what I take
to be his principal observation in three ways.
First, increasing returns to scale in questions of national defense may
not be present so frequently as Hoag implies. It is useful to consider
four stages of the input-output sequence related to national defense: (1)
the cost to the national economy of raising and equipping its forces,
developing new weapons and weapons systems, and producing military
hardware; (2) the deployment of military forces so raised and equipped;
(3) the success such forces obtain in achieving military objectives, e.g.,
beating an enemy force or preventing an enemy attack; and (4) the
social utility of these military successes to the nation. Typical discussions
of military tactics and strategy focus only on the second and third of
these steps. Lanchester's Law is couched in these terms, and most
military men operate within this frame of reference. The first and last
steps have been left largely to "politics." While they are inevitably po-
litical in the broadest sense, the economist can usefully apply his trade
to the whole process.
Increasing returns of the type considered by Hoag apply largely to
the probability that military success will attend various deployments of
NOTE: The views expressed here do not necessarily represent those of the
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military forces. But increasing returns at this stage can be overshad-
owed by the rising economic and social cost of increasing total military
forces (or, at a less global level, the rising opportunity costs in terms of
over-all military success of enlarging a particular military deployment);
or by the declining marginal utility of the additional benefits as one gets
into the area of "overkill," to apply that expression to local and conven-
tional engagements. Both factors will limit the desirability of expanding
indefinitely the particular deployment. This sort of consideration pre-
sumably led to Hoag's choice of the 8 to 5 ratio of British to German
ships in the pre-1914 Atlantic, rather than 10 to 5 or 12 to 5 or some
higher ratio, even though the increase in probability of a local German
defeat might continue to rise as the ratio is increased.
Second, even when increasing returns do prevail throughout the total
four-step range for decision-making, marginal analysis is far from ir-
relevant. When increasing returns are present, marginal analysis should
indicate that an additional unit of input will bring an enlarged marginal
benefit. In that case, use of the input should be expanded. The expansion
should stop only when marginal costs equal marginal benefits, regard-
less of whether both are falling or both are rising. Needless to say, this
equality will be reached only after marginal benefits have begun to fall
faster than marginal costs, or marginal costs have begun to rise faster
than marginal benefits. But in military as in economic affairs, all good
things must come to an end, and sooner or later increasing returns in one
part of the process bearing on decisions will be swamped by rising costs
or decreasing returns in others. Consumer saturation has its military
analogue in overkill.
Third, while marginal analysis admittedly does fail in the presence of
increasing returns to indicate whether an enterprise should be under-
taken at all (not, if it is undertaken, how far to expand it), in defense
economics the question whether to undertake an enterprise or exercise
at all does not depend alone, or even primarily, on static analysis of in-
creasing returns. It can be answered only by taking into account the ad-
versary-relationship——the dynamics of an arms race or a force-mobility
race or an information-gathering race. This relationship is not present
in the decreasing-cost generation of electricity for atomistic consumers.
But it dominates the analytics of military confrontation. The enemy will
typically understand the same principles of increasing returns to con-
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great advantage during World War II by concentrating its forces for
attack and by avoiding heavily defended areas. Accurate information
takes on critical importance in achieving this concentration, as in the
Battle of Midway in which the United States gained local sea and air
superiority, despite its over-all inferiority, by cracking the Japanese
code; or as at Pearl Harbor where the Japanese caught a superior force
off guard. Gaining local superiority—in alertness and effectiveness as
well as in numbers—requires outwitting the opponent. But here it is
bilateral duopoly and the presence of uncertainty or ignorance which
complicates the analysis, not the existence of increasing returns implied
in a Lanchester's Law.
Thus, loosely speaking, in "tactics" marginal analysis is helpful even
in the presence of increasing returns, while in "strategy" the existence of
increasing returns is overshadowed by the dynamics of interaction.
The foregoing remarks, like Hoag's paper, concentrate on Lanchester's
Law and its variants as the principal example of economies of scale in
military situations. Hoag refers only briefly to economies of scale in
production. Perhaps that is the correct relative weight to attach to these
two areas, but I would have preferred to see more discussion of the latter.
Standardization of weapons permits bOth production and logistical econ-
omies. With the development of satellites, gathering weather and other
photographic information involves considerable economies of scale; and
crytography is perhaps the most interesting case of all, where a myriad
of small and seemingly insignificant pieces of information isoften
needed to make over-all sense out of the enemy's behavior and a very
large establishment is required for maximum advantage. The economies
in these critical areas are enormous and the benefits are enhanced pre-
cisely because of the possible substitution of information, surprise, and
maneuver for sheer force, which Hoag rightly emphasizes.
The presence of economies of scale or, more correctly, of discon-
tinuities or lumpiness in military operations suggests that countries large
in economic resources will gain increasing advantage over small coun-
tries or over countries unwilling to devote their resources to military
and defense-related expenditures. Even medium-sized countries appar-
ently cannot develop today's weapons systems alone, as evidenced by
the British decision to buy the F-ill from the United States rather
than develop its own version. The British-French effort to maintain a
modern aircraft industry through joint development of the Concorde, the54 Applying Economics to Defense Problems
French reliance on U.S. firms for a computer industry, Euratom, and
increasing discussion of a European satellite system (including launching
vehicles), all indicate that alliances are sought to overcome these dis-
continuities.
The Olson-Zeckhauser paper is concerned with alliances, but its focus
is on public goods rather than economies of scale. Most of their paper
is occupied by criticism of the finding by Buchanan and Kafoglis that
pure public goods may be purchased in excessive amounts if left en-
tirely to the market. This finding, as Olson and Zeckhauser point out,
rests on the selection of an inefficient production technique in the case
of market decisions, whereas under collective decision the more efficient
production technique (involving externalities) can be chosen. Thus where
externalities are present, we are not only likely to get too little of the
product in a free market system, but what we get will be produced
inefficiently as well—possibly leading to larger expenditures than other-
wise but with less product.
This is an important proposition. It is not of course a new justifica-
tion for intervention in market decisions. Greater efficiency has long
been one reason advanced for collectivization of goods and services,
whether that efficiency is based on economies of scale, on externalities,
or on avoidance of avoidable overhead costs. Both economies of scale
and externalities have been used, for example, as an argument for public
development of the Snake River—that one large public dam was less
costly for the same product than three small private ones. Efficiency
based on the presence of quasi-joint products (where producing good A
greatly lowers the cost of producing good B)—one version of ex-
ternalities—has frequently provided the rationale for multipurpose river
development, where recreation and navigation are combined with public
power. Britain's move to nationalize the health services, which before
nationalization were said to have entailed many wasteful overhead ex-
penditures and to have provided too little service per unit of cost, was
based in part on the social disutility of having substantial numbers of the
public who either could not or would not afford proper medical care;
in part on the desire to avoid avoidable costs. Compulsory social security
also combines reduction of a social disutility (a large population of in-
digent aged) with real economies from pooling all risks, thus avoiding
the need for developing many different risk categories and eliminating
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market place would not only have failed to take into account the ex-
ternal effects, but also would have resulted in a higher cost per unit of
output.
Having agreed with the major proposition of Olson and Zeckhauser,
I will quibble with them on two minor points and on their application of
the finding to alliances.
First, the authors implicitly treat the term "collective good" as co-
extensive with "externality." I would consider externalities to represent
a much broader class of phenomena than collective goods. Externalities
are essentially nonappropriable by-products of some producing or con-
suming firm or person. The fragrance of an orchard and the smoke of a
factory are examples. In contrast, a collective good is itself the object of
a decision to consume, and all consumers enjoy the same product.
A collective good can be regarded as a limiting case of an externality.
Thus when a wealthy neighbor hires a private guard to protect his
property, some protection is presumably also afforded to the immediate
neighborhood insofar as potential housebreakers and other criminals
are not likely to perform their activities within view of the guard even
when his responsibility, strictly speaking, does not reach out to the
property in question. There is an external benefit. If the residents of a city
block decide to hire a local police force, each member of the block will
be fully protected, even though he does not participate in financing the
force (provided the crime deterrent effect of the police force is complete).
Crime deterrence is a pure collective good. Thus there is a continuum.
As the externalities become more and more important relative to the
principal item of production or consumption, more and more of a "col-
lective good" aspect is involved. Pure public goods represent the limiting
case in which the externalities dominate entirely and the "principal" good
being produced or consumed disappears—or rather becomes coextensive
with the "externality." 1
Second,I am troubled by Olson and Zeckhauser's apparent endorse-
1Viewingcollective goods merely as a limiting case of externalities ignores
one important distinction which is sometimes made. An externality can be defined
toinvolvethenonappropriabilityof costsor benefitsthroughthemarket
mechanism. Public goods or collective goods, on the other hand, can be defined
to include all those products for which consumption by A in no way reduces
consumption by B, C, etc., even though exclusion from the benefits (appropria-
bility)is technically feasible. An electronic "lighthouse" with coded signals and
pay TV are usually given as examples of collective goods of this type. But in
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ment of the point made in Baumol's paper, namely, that "the usual
marginal rules for maximization can lead the society away from the
peak of the social welfare function." It is not clear what the "usual rules"
for maximization are when more than one instrument variable is in-
volved. It is true that guidance by a single partial derivative can increase
the horizontal distance from the peak of a social welfare function even
though it increases welfare, as Olson and Zeckhauser illustrate. But if
the social welfare function is convex—i.e. it has no wrinkles, valleys,
saddle points, etc.—application of the gradient method will always lead
one both up the hill and toward the ultimate objective, never away from
it. The gradient method selects the weights to be attached to the various
action variables, the weights being chosen so as to maximize the rate of
climb on each step up the social welfare hill. Using it, we do the best
we can on each little step, when we are not sure where the peak is. (If
we do know exactly where the peak is and can take big enough steps,
we should not consider "marginal" rules in the first place.) This approach
assumes implicitly that costs of horizontal movement are uniform. If this
is not so, a different rule of maximization would be appropriate, but this
would also call for a different definition of "movement toward the peak."
Finally, while I agree with the basic observation of Olson and Zeck-
hauser that collective goods involve an important dimension of ef-
ficiency, and that efficiency in production may vary substantially among
those who could provide the collective good, I find their ready applica-
tion of this observation to military alliances too uncritical and unqualified.
There are several important reasons why members of an alliance may not
want to divide their responsibilities in the provision of collective goods
strictly along the lines of "comparative advantage."
A defensive alliance, like a private police force, certainly has a public
good aspect, as the authors have shown in another paper; but it is not
a pure public good. If strategic deterrence were effective and could be
relied upon to be 100 per cent effective, it would be a pure public good.
But if deterrence cannot be fully counted upon, then the strategic alli-
ance ceases to offer a pure public good. Military defense runs into
capacity limitations, and not all areas can be defended equally well.
Choices must be made in deploying forces in battle, and those citizens
whose territory is left undefended will lose their "share" of the alleged
public good. Consumption by A does reduce consumption by B.
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ful reason why alliance members would not want to divide their re-
sponsibilities and contributions strictly along the lines of "comparative
advantage." If deterrence fails, their interests begin to diverge.
A second important reason why strict comparative advantage will not
offer the optimal pattern of production among members of an alliance
is the presence of joint products with some—but not all—military ex-
penditures for the alliance. The presence of military forces in an alliance
can serve national foreign policy purposes quite apart from the objectives
of the alliance. As long as national authorities maintain some control
over their forces or as long as some of their forces can be withdrawn
from commitment to alliance objectives, they will have national value
beyond their contribution to the alliance. But the possibilities for non-
alliance use of military forces vary greatly by type of force.
Provision for internal security is an obvious nonalliance use deriving
from some weapon systems. The rationale for a land army or for armed
coastal ships is defense of the territory; but these same forces double as
police reserves. Such uses of military forces is frequently made around the
world, and is occasionally used even in such stable societies as the
United States and Britain. Polaris missiles are not helpful in curbing riots
in Little Rock or Watts, but infantry reserves are.
A joint product deriving from other types of military expenditure, ad-
mittedly more controversial, concerns the civilian by-products of military
research, development, and production of continually improving weapons
systems. Keeping up-to-date militarily through the nation's own efforts
serves both to maintain in being a continuously exercised body of sci-
entific and technical research skills, and to provide technological "fall-
out" to the civilian economy from military research in metallurgy,
plastics, aerodynamics, etc. For both reasons the country allegedly re-
mains in the forefront of advancing knowledge technology, and 'this can
contribute both to national prestige and to material well-being.2
For all these reasons it is doubtful whether following strict lines of
comparative advantage in military expenditures within an alliance is
either practicable or optimal. Few countries will want to specialize corn-
2Thecontroversy, of course,is whether on balance military R and D has
a positive external effect as implied above, or a negative one. Some students of
the subject have suggested that the demands placed on scientific and technical
skills by military requirements, by withdrawing such skills from thecivi'ian
economy, more than offset the various benefits to the civilian economy which
result from Government expenditures in these areas.58 Applying Economics to Defense Problems
pletely in one military activity, e.g., provision of foot soldiers, no matter
how great their comparative advantage in doing so. For much the same
kinds of reasons that less-developed countries want to foster and protect
manufacturing industry, the members of an alliance will want to foster
and protect certain kinds of military expenditure. And the result will not
necessarily be suboptimal.3
3Forthese same reasons, incidentally, provision of a public good may not fall
below the optimum amount when left to private decisions. If private joint products
are important enough, more than enough public goods will be provided. If candy
also immunized against smallpox, we would not need school vaccination pro-
grams.
JACQUES VAN YPERSELE DE STRIHOU, International Monetary Fund
In their interesting paper Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser have
addressed themselves to the question of whether the market provision
of a public good would lead to suboptimal amounts of the goods being
produced. Refuting the objections from Buchanan, Kafoglis and Baumol,
the authors conclude that when external economies are present, inde-
pendent adjustment in a market will not only provide less of the good
than is optimal, as Pigou had shown, but will often also make society
pay more for the suboptimal quantity of the good than it would have
had to pay for the larger amount an ideal collective arrangement would
provide. Applying this reasoning to the problem of military alliance
which produces a public good: defense, Olson and Zeckhauser conclude
that an alliance organized in the way NATO is organized suffers from at
least two systematic inefficiencies. On the one hand it will produce a sub-
optimal output of the public good, defense; and on the other, it will fail
to produce that amount of defense it does obtain in the most efficient
places.
In these few comments 1Iwould like to question the application to the
military alliance of the principles developed in the first part of the paper.
I will first emphasize the limits of the basic assumption underlying the
NOTE: Any views expressed in these comments are those of the author and
should not be interpreted as reflecting those of the organization to which the
author belongs.
1Inthese comments I will draw on some elements of my Ph.D. Dissertation on
"Sharing the Defense Burden among Western Allies," Yale University,1966,
which was written under the helpful guidance of Professors Richard Cooper
and Gustav Ranis, and with the financial support of the Council on International
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last part of the paper, namely that defense is an international public
good in the alliance. Showing that defense on the international level is
only partly a public good and pointing out another characteristic of
defense, namely that it provides joint products private to each country,
has implications for the efficiency with which defense is produced. These
implications, I believe, will invalidate partly at least the normative con-
clusions drawn by the authors of the paper with respect to the degree of
specialization which would be optimal for the countries of the alliance.
I will also discuss briefly the fact that the joint-product characteristic
of defense may also lead to a lesser degree of suboptimality in the
provision of external security.
Let us first analyze briefly the concept of external security, and see
to what extent it is a public good on the national level. Then we will
analyze how in an alliance it can be considered as an international public
good.
Assuming a given threat common to all Western countries, the security
of the citizens of any NATO country A involves at least three aspects
at a given moment.
1. The deterrence controlled by country A and that provided by its
allies to deter the enemy from attacking country A or any other NATO
country whose security is directly related to A's security. As is well
known, deterrence is based on a force capable of inflicting on an aggres-
sor, even after a massive surprise attack, enough losses to deter him
from launching such an attack and on the willingness to use these forces
to oppose any aggression. Together the ability and the willingness to use
force will make the threat of retaliation credible. Deterrence can be ex-
pressed in terms of probability of nonattack by the enemy.
2. If deterrence fails, security then depends on the country's ability
with its allies to defend itself and escape destruction. This is what the
U.S. Secretary of Defense calls the "damage limitation capability." It
can be expressed in number of men saved in cases of enemy attack.
3. A third aspect of security, is the ability each country has, to pre-
vent being drawn into another country's war against its own will.
Let us now recall the two characteristics of a public good: (a) the
"nonrivalness" characteristic, or as Samuelson has expressed it, that each
individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from
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which means that it is not possible or not economical to exclude people
who do not pay for the services from the benefits that result.
Let us now analyze how the two first aspects of security can be con-
sidered as a public good for the citizens of a given country A. We will
then transpose the problem to the international scene.
1. Deterrence on the national level is the example closest to that of a
pure public good. The first characteristic of a public good is fully met
indeed. The enjoyment of deterrence for instance by a New Yorker
does not decrease the security of a Californian. The cost of applying
this deterrence to one more individual coming into this country is
zero. The second characteristic of nonexciusion is also fully met. No one
can be excluded from the benefit of national deterrence once it is pro-
vided.
2. The second aspect of security—defense if deterrence fails—does
not meet in all cases fully the characteristics of a pure public good and
in some cases is even a private good.
Once deterrence fails, one meets a capacity problem, even in the use
of the equipment initially designed for deterrence. The means of defense
will not necessarily provide security to all the citizens of the country.
While many instruments of defense will provide the same degree of pro-
tection to the whole country, others will extend their protection only to
limited areas and will be public goods only for the citizens of this area,
and not for those outside it. Indeed in this case if citizens of one area
receive more protection this means fewer resources will be left for the
protection of citizens in other areas.
Examples of defense instruments with strictly local impact are com-
munity shelters or local antimissile defenses. In some cases even the pro-
tection provided will be a private good because consumption of security
by one individual will rival that of another. Examples of this are
private nuclear shelters which provide a certain external security but
which do not meet the first or the second characteristic of the public good,
once deterrence fails.
Let us now transpose the problem onto the international level and
see to what extent security can be considered as an international public
good in the NATO Alliance.
1. Deterrence meets partly at least the first characteristic of a public
good. Indeed, assuming for a moment that the alliance is composed of
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amount of deterrence against enemy attack on Europe is a part of U.S.
security. Since this deterrence for Europe is already part of the security
the U.S. provides for itself, the cost of extending this deterrence to
Europe is zero. Similarly, the deterrence against attack on the U.S. is
part of European security.
However, the deterrence against attack on Europe which is part of
the security of the U.S. is not necessarily the same as the amount of
deterrence provided to U.S. citizens. Pledging the same deterrence to
Europe in all circumstances as to the U.S. may indeed include positive
marginal costs and may even decrease the level of U.S. security, if we
recall the third aspect of security—the ability to stay out of other coun-
tries' conflicts.
The second characteristic of a public good, nonexciusion, is not met.
Even in an alliance, the U.S. for instance, could to decrease its
deterrence for a European power by decreasing the credibility of its
defense of this ally. It is partly the awareness of this possibility which
has led France to start building its own deterrence.
France believes that the deterrence provided by the U.S. to its affies
is not perfectly automatic and not of the same value as the one pro-
vided to American citizens, due to different costs and risks. France em-
phasizes that while the deterrence of attack on the U.S. rests unambigu-
ously upon nuclear retaliation, this is not the case for Europe.
2. The second element of security, defense if deterrence fails, is not
a pure public good. The first characteristic of a public good is not neces-
sarily met. If deterrence fails, a capacity problem is met in the ability to
defend citizens. So, in some cases providing more defense for European
countries may mean less protection for the U.S., although the defense
of different countries will not necessarily be rival in all cases. For in-
stance, the use of U.S. missiles to destroy the attack centers of the enemy
will also protect any allies who face the same threat. The U.S. Secretary
of Defense recently emphasized this aspect by saying "... wedo not
view damage limitation as a question of concern only to the U.S. Our
offensive forces cover strategic enemy capabilities to inflict damage on
our allies in Europe just as they cover enemy threats to the continent." 2
Thesecond characteristic of a public good—nonexciusion—is not
2Statementto the House Armed Services Committee cited by The New York
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perfectly met either. If deterrence fails, the U.S. for instance is not
bound to give the same protection to Europe as to itself.
Since the external security in the alliance is not a pure public good, the
member countries will avoid the extreme specialization, which the authors
of the paper seem to advocate, and which would not allow them to
operate independently—for the case where they would benefit from
only a part of their allies' deterrence—or for the case where deterrence
fails. In other words, accepting a complete specialization according to
comparative advantage will not be optimal for the member countries.
Another characteristic of defense, namely that in addition to alliance
security it provides joint products which are not, or are only partly,
shared with other allies, also affects the efficiency with which defense is
provided in the alliance. Such benefits are, for instance, the internal
security that can be provided by the armed forces, or nonalliance po-
litical benefits which can be obtained through the possession of a strong
military force or the actual use ofComplete specialization in accord-
ance with comparative advantage may not allow the member countries
to obtain the joint products of defense which they also seek. For in-
stance, a country which would have a comparative advantage in provid-
ing missiles may not want to limit itself to this category of military equip-
ment but may want to provide part of its contribution in conventional
forces which can help it to obtain national joint products such as in-
ternal security.
This characteristic of defense—namely that it provides joint products
—can also affect the degree of suboptimality with which external security
is provided in the alliance. Indeed the existence of these joint products
may induce countries to provide more defense than they would provide
if there were only the external security benefits. For instance at the time
of colonial wars, some Western countries had much larger forces—
which could also be used for the common security—than they would
have had if defense provided only the common external security.
Let me briefly summarize my comment. While agreeing with the
theoretical concepts developed by Olson and Zeckhauser in the first part
of their paper, I believe that their application of this theory to the
military alliance is not entirely correct. It would be optimal for the
For a more detailed• discussion of these joint products, see J. van Ypersele
de Strihou, "Sharing the Defense Burden among Western Allies," Review 0/
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countries of the alliance to make their contributions according to com-
parative advantage, if defense were a public good and did not provide
private joint products. But, as I have tried to argue, defense in the al-
liance is not a pure public good, and it provides joint products to each
country which are not or are only partly shared with the allies. Finally
the joint product characteristic may tend to decrease the degree of sub-
optimality in the provision of defense in the alliance.